This paper o¤ers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a di¤erential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of …rms in the commons is also addressed.
Introduction
More often than not, the economic theory of natural resources and the environment treats the environmental impact of production/consumption and resource extraction separately. Of course this facilitates the analysis of each of these issues in isolation, but leaves aside the circular nature of the overall problem by overlooking the feedback e¤ects between the two sides of what is in fact a single coin. The interplay I am referring to becomes self evident as soon as one thinks about the fact that, for more than two and a half centuries since the beginning of the industrial revolution, the modern economic systems we are acquainted with have consistently relied on fossil energy sources which are by nature brown and non-renewable to sustain the growth rates of consumption and GDP. This twofold pressure exerted on resources and the environment is compromising the sustainability of economic growth as we know it, as well as the ecosystem's capability to absorb and neutralise greenhouse gases (GHG), leaving no great expectations as for the welfare of generations still to be born, in absence of drastic changes in the nature and impact of productive technologies. The picture is made even gloomier by the possibility of the so-called green paradox looming through the veil of an uncertain future, i.e., the possibility that boosting policy incentives to accelerate the introduction of clean technologies causes a higher extraction rate of fossil fuels, thereby intensifying global warming. 1 Here, I am setting out to summarise the extant discussion on the interplay between resource extraction and polluting emissions in static and dynamic oligopoly games. Several surveys are already available in this area (see Jørgensen et al., 2010; Long, 2010; , iter alia).
Hence, after outlining the essential features of the problem at hand in this 1 See Sinn (2012) introduction, I will o¤er an overview of the related literature and a dynamic model describing the role of industry structure in a di¤erential game in which pro…t-maximising …rms (i) exploit a common pool resource to supply a consumption good which (ii) pollutes the environment, while (iii) the government adopts an emission tax to stimulate …rms'investments in green technologies, and (iv) may regulate the …rms'access to the common pool resource (or the industry).
To grasp the essence of the impact of the intensity of competition or industry structure on the environment, it is su¢ cient to brie ‡y dwell upon the usual interpretation we are used to give to competition versus market power, and then contrast it with the consequences we may expect to emerge from increasing competition in a setup where the environmental consequences of production and/or consumption are duly accounted for. Any increase in competition lowers prices and expands output levels, thereby lowering …rms' pro…ts and enhancing consumer surplus. All of this can be summarised under the label of price e¤ect. However, any output expansion associated to the price e¤ect intensi…es the pressure on natural resources (accelerating their extraction) and the environment (increasing GHG emissions, for any given set of technologies in use). This is the external e¤ect. Our appraisal of the pros and cons of modifying the number of …rms in an industry boils down to the balance between these two e¤ects, and the relative weights we attribute to the components of the welfare function. It is then immediate to infer that the regulation of GHG emissions and resource extraction and its interplay with industry structure and R&D incentives have simultaneously to do with the tragedy of commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968) , market integration (or, international trade and globalization), and growth.
Related literature
The core problem that has generated a major stream of research on the interplay between resource extraction, the environmental consequences of production and the possibility of regulating either one or both can be traced back to the idea that those entitled to appropriate the rent generated by natural resources could be a¤ected by carbon taxes allowing governments to reap some of that rent. Unsurprisingly, oligopolistic interaction has not been considered as a fundamental ingredient in modelling this issue. In fact, the backbone of the dynamic analysis carried out on this leitmotiv (Markusen, 1975; Sinclair, 1992 Sinclair, , 1994 Ulph and Ulph, 1994; Wirl, 1994; 1995; Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996; Tahvonen, 1996; Rubio and Escriche, 2001 ) focusses on monopolistic extraction, where this single agent is a cartel (say, OPEC).
The resulting discussion can indeed be summarised in a simple model, where accumulated extraction is the only state variable measuring at the same time the stock of pollution at every instant. Hence, one could equivalently think of a situation in which extraction is being taxed. This level of approximation is indeed admissible and even sensible if the decay rate of pollution is very small or, as is currently being stressed by IPCC and several other sources, 3 the planets'capability of absorbing and neutralising emission is compromised.
The game takes place between an importing country and a monopolistic seller holding the property rights on a brown resource (say, a fossil fuel).
The resource stock at time t is X (t) while the extraction rate is determined by the following instantaneous demand function expressed by the importing country: where a is a positive constant measuring the choke price, p (t) is the price set by the foreign monopolist, and (t) is the tax rate applied onto the resource by the importing country's government. For all a > p (t) + (t) ; the tax revenue is R (t) = (t) Q (t) and consumer surplus is CS (t) = Q 2 (t) =2:
The stock externality is D (t) = S 2 (t) ; whose dynamics is
where the decay rate is nil and therefore the environmental damage is irreversible.
The tax revenue is being redistributed to the citizens of the importing country, whose instantaneous welfare function is therefore de…ned as follows:
so that the problem of the government is
under the constraints posed by the state equation (3) and the initial condition
The monopolistic seller's objective consists in solving the following problem:
under the same set of constraints. It is worth observing that, in (5), the shape of the extraction cost is determined by the fact that, in equilibrium, the resource consumption is necessarily equal to its extraction rate. Moreover, as a result, cumulative emissions must correspond to cumulative extractions.
Solving this game under imperfect information (i.e., assuming simultaneous moves), Wirl (1994 Wirl ( , 1995 shows that the outcome of linear feedback strategies Pareto-dominates that generated by non-linear strategies. Tahvonen (1996) extends the analysis to the case of Stackelberg play, with the exporting cartel taking the leader's role, and shows that the optimal Pigouvian tax rate is higher that the rate emerging at the Stackelberg equilibrium, proving that the cartel may in fact design its price policy so as to soften the tax pressure and the resulting revenues accruing to the importing country.
Rubio and Escriche (2001) revisit the model to shed some new light on the dual role of the emission tax in correcting the externality and extracting a portion of the rent from the supplier's pockets, establishing that the Nash equilibrium tax is neutral in the latter respect, in the sense that it corrects the ine¢ ciency cause by the external e¤ect without a¤ecting the supplier's monopoly power. 4 A related aspect concerns the intertemporal behaviour of the carbon tax (Sinclair, 1994; Ulph and Ulph, 1994 ). Shall we expect to observe a monotone relationship between the optimal carbon tax and the residual stock of the natural resource being extracted? According to Sinclair (1992) and Ulph and Ulph (1994) , the optimal tax is indeed decreasing over time as the residual resource stock also declines, provided that the percentage reduction in that same stock determines the rate of growth of pollution. However, Ulph and Ulph (1994) show that if instead one allows for a full- ‡edged picture in which CO 2 emissions are not measured by the extraction rate, then the optimal carbon tax is initially increasing (when the stock of pollution is comparatively small) and then decreasing (towards the end of the natural resource's life). 5 To the best of my knowledge, the extension of this model to allow for proper (i.e., noncooperative) oligopolistic interaction has yet to be pursued.
What is available is an extension of the dynamic Cournot game with pol- As a preliminary step, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the foregoing synthesis of a still lively debate takes as a pivotal element the environmental e¤ects of a traded resource whose exploitation is being taxed. or consumption (or both) entail the emission of pollutants. Let the relevant social welfare function at any given time be SW (q (n; )) = (q (n; ) ; k (n; ) ; T (q (n; ))) + CS (q (n; )) (6) +X (q (n; ) ; D (q (n; ) ; k (n; ))) + T (q (n; )) D (q (n; ) ; k (n; ))
where q (n; ) is the vector of quantities chosen by …rms, and depends on the number of …rms in the industry, n; as well as on the level of the emission tax rate set by the government to stimulate green R&D activities k (n; ) ;
and ultimately to diminish the environmental damage D (q (n; ) ; k (n; )), increasing in q (n; ) and decreasing in q (n; ). The remaining components of social welfare are industry pro…ts (q (n; ) ; k (n; ) ; T (q (n; ))) ;
consumer surplus CS (q (n; )) ; the residual stock of the natural resource X (q (n; ) ; D (q (n; ) ; k (n; ))) (which may well be negatively a¤ected by the impact of the environmental damage) and the total revenue T (q (n; )) generated by the emission tax.
In the light of (6), the government has two instruments, namely, the emission tax and market access (i.e., a limit posed on n) to regulate this industry. The …rst tool may alternatively be tuned so as to (i) minimise the environmental damage (in combination with green innovation), or (ii) maximise social welfare as a whole, disregarding the size of each of its components. The second tool -regulating market access -is traditionally viewed as a means to attain the optimal number of …rms in the commons. 7 This, in turn, may consist either in maximising the residual stock of the resource or social welfare (in which case the residual stock must be non negative). In the remainder, I will illustrate a di¤erential oligopoly game envisaging, alternatively, di¤erent regulatory menus along these two dimensions.
9
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with a population N = 1; 2; 3; :::n of singleproduct homogeneous-good …rms interacting over continuous time t 2 [0; 1) :
At any time t, the demand function is p (t) = a Q (t) ; with Q (t) = P n i=1 q i (t) ; q i (t) being the instantaneous individual output of …rm i. The demand function is based on the assumption that consumers do not internalise any external e¤ects, i.e., consumers in this market have not developed any environmental awareness. All …rms use the same productive technology, described by the cost function C i (t) = cq i (t) : The production of the …nal output involves an amount of polluting emissions s i (t) generated by the output of each …rm i and evolving according to the following dynamics:
where > 0 is a constant decay rate and coe¢ cient v 0 measures the volume of CO 2 -equivalent emissions per unit of output. Variable k i (t) is the instantaneous R&D e¤ort of …rm i. The production of the …nal good requires the extraction of a natural resource X (t) whose stock evolves over time according to the following equation:
where b > 0 is the technical coe¢ cient measuring the extraction rate per unit of output, > 0 is the natural rate of reproduction of the resource itself, and 9 A similar but not entirely equivalent approach is adopted in Lambertini and Leitmann parameter z measures the negative impact of polluting emission on the same resource.
The instantaneous cost associated with the R&D activity is i (t) = wk 2 i (t) ; with w > 0, and …rm i's emissions s i (t) are taxed at the rate > 0 at every instant. 11 Hence, …rm i's instantaneous pro…ts are
and each …rm i has to set q i (t) and k i (t) so as to maximise
under the set of state equations (7) and (8) The instantaneous social welfare function is
where CS (t) = Q 2 (t) =2 is consumer surplus and aggregate emissions S (t) = P n i=1 s i (t) cause the quadratic environmental damage S 2 (t) :
Equilibrium analysis
Henceforth, I will omit the time argument for simplicity, whenever possible.
Since the present game is a linear state one, the open-loop solution is sub- game perfect (or strongly time consistent) as it yields a degenerate feedback equilibrium. 12 The current-value Hamiltonian of …rm i is:
where a c > 0 denotes the market dimension.
The necessary conditions (FOCs) are:
where Q i P j6 =i q j , and
The adjoint equations read as follows:
and
From (15-16) Using ij = i = 0 and imposing symmetry on states and controls, I may now proceed to use (13) to derive the control equation for the green R&D e¤ort k; as follows:
which, noting -again from (13) -that = 2wk; can be rewritten as
The optimal output associated with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CN ) at any time t can instead be directly obtained by solving FOC (12):
which obviously collapses onto the static Cournot-Nash output any green R&D e¤ort being absent.
I am now in a position to rewrite the state equations as follows:
and then impose stationarity on the two states and the R&D control to obtain the following single triple of steady state values:
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the expression of k in (21) reveals that green R&D e¤orts are observed at equilibrium if and only if > 0;
which is a recurrent theme in static and dynamic models of environmental R&D, 13 and, more interestingly, that aggregate equilibrium R&D expenditure is increasing monotonically in the number of …rms. In the light of the long-standing querelle about the so called Schumpeterian hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1942) on the direct relationship between innovation incentives and industry concentration, and the opposite position taken by Arrow (1962) , one may formulate the following claim:
Lemma 1 For any emission tax rate ; the pattern of aggregate R&D e¤ort at equilibrium is Arrovian.
The above Lemma conveys good news, insofar as increasing industry fragmentation induces the whole sector to intensify its aggregate investment in environmental-friendly technologies, a fact which, in itself, at least partially o¤sets the negative impact of the price e¤ect.
Using k ; the steady state output level rewrites as follows:
There remains to observe that
with s < q in the whole admissible range of parameters. Hence, the foregoing analysis proves:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique steady state point fs ; X ; k ; q g ; with s ; X ; k ; q > 0 for all As to the stability properties of the dynamic systems, the following can be shown to hold:
Proposition 3 > is a su¢ cient condition for the steady state fs ; X ; k ; q g to be a saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In plain words, this amounts to saying that if the natural rate of reproduction of the natural resource exceeds the discount rate applied by …rms to future pro…ts (and by the policy maker to the welfare of future generations) then the strategic game generates a stable equilibrium.
At this point, one may note that a policy maker may regulate this industry using two instrument, and n, for two di¤erent purposes. What if, e.g., the emission tax is …ne tuned to eliminate emissions altogether, and entry is limited in such a way that the resulting residual stock of the natural resource is maximised? The …rst problem is obviously solved setting = s :
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Corollary 4 If
= s = 2 ( + ) vw 2v 2 w + n + 1 then the steady state level of emissions is nil.
It is worth stressing that this happens thanks to the …rms'R&D e¤orts directed at reducing emissions without compromising the positivity of individual Cournot-Nash output levels. If the tax rate = s is indeed adopted, the aggregate green R&D e¤ort at equilibrium is
14 It is worth stressing that the result stated in Corollary 4 must be taken cum grano salis, as it literally implies a violation of the second law of thermodynamics. What really matters is that the model allows for a degree of environmental innovation su¢ cient to ensure that the impact of the technology in use be lower than the natural rate of GHG absorption.
with
con…rming the result illustrated in Lemma 1.
The other aspect of the regulator's problem refers indeed to identifying the optimal number of …rms in the commons. One could think of an access fee to the commons (say, F per …rm), which can be left unmodeled if the revenue generated by this source is redistributed to consumers (as it is assumed to be the case for the tax revenue). Relying on the above Corollary, it is easily established that
in correspondence of
This exercise establishes the following result:
Corollary 5 If z < b =v; then the industry structure that maximises the residual resource stock in steady state is n X = b = (vz) > 1: Otherwise, the residual stock is maximised under monopoly.
The consequences of choosing the pair (n X ; s ) on welfare are captured
The above expressions imply that choosing n to maximise X excludes the attainment of welfare maximisation, except in the very special (and extremely unlikely) case in which z + vw (vz b ) = 0: As an alternative, the regulator may set n so as to maximise welfare, in combination with the choice of s .
If so, we have:
where
It is easily ascertained that
since > 0; and
which is positive -for instance -if market size is su¢ ciently large or z (measuring the negative impact of emissions on the natural resource) is low enough. If indeed the sign of (36) is positive, then @SW @n
Taking into account (30), this yields:
If so, then at n = n SW it is necessarily true that @X =@nj = s < 0:
The above result raises one last question, namely, whether the industry structure that maximises social welfare entails resource exhaustion or not.
The answer is swiftly delivered by substituting s into X ; which can be simpli…ed as follows:
for all admissible values of n; obviously including n SW . This …nding produces one last claim:
The industry structure maximising the equilibrium level of social welfare, coupled with the emission tax rate minimising the environmental impact of production, allows for the preservation of a strictly positive stock of resource in steady state.
In a nutshell, what the above Corollary says is that the industry structure that maximises welfare as a result of a compromise between expanding the usual components of welfare (i.e., producer and consumer surplus) in absence of externalities or when the latter are disregarded is compatible with the minimization of polluting emissions (which is obvious, as is set at s ) and with the preservation of a positive volume of the natural resource stock.
Concluding remarks
The above model delivers a few positive messages, namely, that there exists a tax policy which may minimise total emissions and simultaneously stimulate green R&D whose volume is increasing in the number of …rms. However, allowing access to the commons to additional …rms may compromise the preservation of the resource stock, which might bene…t from granting monopoly power. This speci…c feature brings the discussion back to the earlier model on which an entire stream of literature is based, where indeed monopoly was assumed as representative of cartels controlling natural resources, in particular fossil fuels.
All of this apparently implies the following. Understanding the interplay between pollution and resource exploitation and design the most e¢ cient policy measures is, most probably, one of the most challenging task posed to the economic theory of natural resources and the environment, as it requires a thorough analysis of many equally important factors such as the intensity of competition, market integration, a menu of policy instruments and technical progress, all of which are put together in a single melting pot.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
The stability properties of the model can be assessed relying on Dockner's 
whose determinant is
for all > (and conversely).
Dockner's K (see Dockner and Feichtinger, 1991, pp. 45-46) is identi…ed by the following expression:
where matrices M 1 ; M 2 and M 3 are the following: 
and is a su¢ cient condition to ensure K < 0: Now, if (i) K < 0; (ii) J > 0 and (iii) K 2 =4 > J jointly hold, then we have saddle point stability with four real eigenvalues, two being positive and two being negative (cf.
Dockner and Feichtinger, 1991, Lemma 2, p. 35). The su¢ cient condition for this result is indeed > .
